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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of IntelligenceDRAFT WORKING PAPERThe Probable Strength
of the Viet Cong Main and Local
and North Vietnamese Army Forces
in South Vietnam
31 January 1968Summary

A preliminary review of the evidence indicates that the strength of the Communist Main and Local Forces -- as MACV defines them -- was considerably greater than the 115,000-odd soldiers carried in the Order of Battle (OB) on 31 January 1968, the day the enemy's Tet offensive began. The actual number of such forces probably exceeded 160,000 by a substantial margin. There are three reasons why the OB was low. First, the OB, which does not employ certain types of evidence [REDACTED] had not picked up several Communist formations in South Vietnam which failed to measure up to its strict acceptance criteria. Second, the OB omitted large numbers of small units subordinate to echelons above village level. And third, certain MACV accounting procedures tend to minimize the number

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of soldiers carried in units held in the OB. This estimate excludes from consideration the substantial infusion of upgraded guerrillas, new recruits, and impressed civilians into the Main and Local Force ranks immediately before the Tet offensive.

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Introduction

1. There were probably over 160,000 Viet Cong Main and Local Forces and North Vietnamese Army soldiers -- as defined by MACV* -- present in South Vietnam on 31 January 1968, when MACV's Order of Battle (OB) carried their numbers at 115,016. The higher number includes the following components:

The OB	115,000
Units not picked up in the OB as of 31 January 1968	22,000
Small units omitted from the OB	10,000 to 11,000
Soldiers probably missing from the OB because of certain MACV accounting practices	11,000 to 16,000
<i>Total</i>	<i>158,000 to 164,000</i>

2. The range is merely indicative of an order of magnitude. Because there are additional factors which have tended to minimize the number of men carried in the OB, but to which estimates were not assigned, the range is believed to be conservative.

* The Viet Cong's definitions of the Main and Local Forces are considerably broader than those of MACV. The Viet Cong would include among the Main and Local Forces large numbers of soldiers MACV classifies as belonging to the "Administrative Services." For a brief discussion of MACV's and the Communists' definitions, see Appendix A. This memorandum follows MACV definitions throughout.

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Communist Units Not Picked Up in the OB
as of 31 January 1968

3. The OB had not picked up several Communist units present in South Vietnam on 31 January 1968 because the evidence concerning them apparently was insufficient to meet its strict criteria for acceptance.*

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The units described were south of the DMZ and were not, as far as could be determined, created from already existing formations in South Vietnam. They were:

304th Infantry Division	10,000
320th Infantry Division	7,000
31st Infantry Regiment	2,000
40th Artillery Regiment	1,500
208th Artillery Regiment	1,500
Total	22,000**

* See Appendix D, which describes the OB's criteria for acceptance.

** Other units may also have been in South Vietnam before Tet. These include the 204th NVA Artillery Regiment, which was located in the eastern DMZ in October 1967, and the 24th Infantry Regiment, possibly near Hue.

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4. The OB has since accepted the presence in South Vietnam in January 1968 of the 304th and 320th Divisions and of the 31st Regiment. Recent POW reports and documents have tended to confirm [] evidence concerning the 40th Artillery Regiment. 1/* The 208th Artillery Regiment has been mentioned in several recent documents.

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Small Units Omitted

5. The Main and Local Force OB omitted large numbers of units of cell through company size subordinate to echelons in the Communist organization between the village and the national levels. Approximately 10,000 to 11,000 such soldiers were omitted from the OB. They belonged to the following formations:

Specialized units (sapper, engineer, intel/recon, special action etc.) subordinate to districts	4,000
Specialized units (same as above) subordinate to provinces	2,000 to 3,000
City units	3,000
Small units subordinate to unusual echelons	1,000
<i>Total</i>	<i>10,000 to 11,000</i>

* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix E.

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6. The Main and Local Force OB carries virtually no small specialized combat units subordinate to districts. These include sapper, engineer, special action, and intelligence/reconnaissance units organized into cells, squads, and platoons. A review of captured documents written in 1966 and 1967 that pertain to 33 of the Viet Cong's 225 districts (as of late 1967)* suggested the average number of soldiers assigned to such units in each district was 18. 2/ As far as can be determined, none of the specialists in the reviewed districts was carried in the OB. If 18-man contingents of specialists were present in 225 VC districts in South Vietnam on 31 January 1968, the number of such soldiers serving at district level was then slightly over 4,000.

7. Likewise, the OB omitted large numbers of sapper, engineer, special action, and intelligence/reconnaissance units subordinate to the 33 or so VC provinces (as of late 1967). As of 31 January

* *The Viet Cong reorganized their administrative boundaries countrywide in South Vietnam in late 1967. MACV now carries 244 VC districts in Vietnam instead of the 225. Because most documentation in this memorandum is dated prior to the reorganization, it uses the older number.*

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1968, the OB had identified only one sapper battalion (the 36th in Binh Dinh) and a total of eight smaller sapper, engineer, and reconnaissance units subordinate to a total of six VC provinces throughout the country. A COSVN directive of April 1966, however, ordered each province to create a sapper company, 3/ and a 1965 document indicated that each province was also supposed to have a reconnaissance platoon. 4/ A variety of captured documents indicate that the provinces have at least attempted to meet the high-level directives. On the basis of these documents, 5/ which suggest that the average number of soldiers attached to specialized combat units subordinate to each province exceeds 100, it is estimated that there were 2,000 to 3,000 such soldiers absent from the OB as of 31 January 1968.

8. All significant urban areas maintain "city units," generally subordinate to the provinces in which they are located and on an organizational par with district units within the provinces. Only two city units (those of Nha Trang and Hue) are identified in the MACV OB, although captured documents and POW reports indicate they are common 6/ and have been in existence at least since 1964. 7/ City

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units vary in size from a platoon (reported in Nha Trang) to units in excess of battalion size (in Hue and Da Nang). On the basis of available evidence, which suggests that the average city unit consists of a company with some additional support troops and is therefore about 100-strong, the number of city unit soldiers absent from the OB -- if it is assumed that such units existed in each VC province capital -- was on the order of 3,000 on 31 January 1968.

9. Small units assigned to unusual command entities seldom appear in the OB. Examples of such formations are plantation units, 8/ certain *vung* (area) units, 9/ and units assigned to American bases. 10/ On the basis of fragmentary evidence, it would probably be realistic to estimate that there were at least a thousand soldiers absent from the OB on 31 January 1968.

10. The quality of the soldiers in the omitted units is generally high. Sapper, engineer, intelligence/reconnaissance, special action, and city formations, which have an unusually large percentage of party members, undergo rigorous and extended courses of instruction in their specialties.

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Captured documents and field reports indicate that these types of soldiers were heavily engaged during the urban phases of the Tet offensive. 11/

Soldiers Probably Missing from the OB Because of Certain MACV Accounting Procedures

11. Certain accounting procedures employed by MACV tend to minimize the number of soldiers it carries in units listed in the OB. The missing soldiers for which estimates are provided may have been on the order of from 11,000 to 16,000.

Soldiers [in the "pipeline"]
legitimately absent from
their units, on TDY

6,000

Unlisted service and support
personnel probably integral
to divisions

5,000 to 10,000

Total

11,000 to 16,000

12. The MACV OB does not customarily take into account soldiers attached to given units but not present for duty. Such soldiers may be attending VC training schools, at convalescent camps (recovering from malaria or light wounds, for example), on leave or rest and rehabilitation, or on work, transport, and rice-growing details. Frequently, such soldiers are described as being in the "pipeline." This estimate considers only

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those absent from their units for legitimate reasons who may reasonably be expected to return to duty in due course.

13. The number of soldiers absent is often high. For example, in mid-1967, a document indicated that the NVA 95th Regiment (of the 5th Division on the B3 Front) had a total of 2,034 men of whom 354 (17 percent) were not present for duty. 12/ The OB then carried the 95th at 1,700 men, or roughly those present for duty.* Another case in point is that of the 101st NVA Regiment last July. The II Field Force OB Summary, dated 14 July 1967, reported to Saigon -- apparently on the basis of a captured document -- that the strength of the 101st was 2,090, "444 of which are listed as absent." The 31 July 1967 MACV OB carried the 101st at 1,650 -- in other words, only those present for duty, but not those absent.

14. Similarly, in counting the personnel strength of schools, convalescent camps, and other

* It is recognized, of course, that the MACV OB sometimes carries units overstrength and that this practice, in effect, takes care of "pipeline" soldiers for units so listed. The overall bias in carrying units, however, is certainly downward, so that far more often than not, the "pipeline" soldiers are not taken into account.

TOP SECRET

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organizations to which Viet Cong TDY soldiers are sent, MACV appears to count only *organic* personnel and not those temporarily attached. For example, it would be likely that in assigning an OB strength to an organization such as the B3 Front Military-Political School, MACV would count only the 140 personnel listed in a captured document as organic, but not the 422 listed as trainees. 13/ Thus it appears that the 422 trainees at the B3 school -- many of whom probably belonged to the 95th Regiment mentioned in the previous paragraph -- are counted neither at the school they attend nor in the units they were sent from. (In the case of this particular school, it is likely that the omitted 422 are of high caliber because only cadres attend region-level political schools.)

15. Not enough data have been developed as yet to determine an exact percentage for soldiers attached to VC units but legitimately absent from duty. Discussions with US military personnel, together with a preliminary inspection of a limited number of Viet Cong morning reports, suggests, however, that 5 percent as a "pipeline" factor is reasonable, if somewhat conservative. Five percent

TOP SECRET

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of 115,000 -- the OB figure as of 31 January 1968 -- is nearly 6,000.

16. It could be argued that the pipelines were cleared for the Tet offensive and that all trainees, leave-takers, reasonably healthy convalescents, and work details were called back to their units. If this was done, then the 5 percent factor should be added directly to the units and not set aside, as under ordinary circumstances.

Unlisted Service and Support Personnel

17. Most divisions in the OB appear to have unrealistically small numbers of integral service and support troops accounted for. Such troops are usually carried in the OB under one of two categories:

a. "Headquarters and support" troops, which include the military, political, and rear service staffs of divisions, and in some cases (for example, the VC 9th Division) 14/ soldiers subordinate to *unidentified* integral support units, and

b. Personnel subordinate to *identified* integral support battalions (such as engineer, transport, signal

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medical, sapper, air defense, and
artillery units).

18. The number of soldiers in both categories totaled 10,255 in the 31 January OB, including 3,475 "headquarters and support" personnel, and 6,780 belonging to 25 identified battalions. (For a breakdown of such soldiers by division, see Appendix B.)

19. An inspection of the divisional totals reveals certain anomalies:

a. The NVA 325C and the NVA 5th Divisions are listed as having only 100 headquarters and support troops each, with no integral support units.

b. The NVA 7th and VC 9th Divisions, although heavy on "headquarters and support" personnel (900 and 750, respectively), are listed as having no integral support units.

20. On the basis of what is known about the organizational structure of a Communist division, the complete absence or near absence of integral support units (as opposed to infantry regiments) is unlikely. A recent study by the US Army

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Pacific (USARPAC) G-2 carries the TOE of a North Vietnamese Army division as having -- in addition to three infantry regiments -- an artillery regiment, an antitank battalion, an antiaircraft battalion, a signal battalion, a medical battalion, a training battalion, a transport company, a reconnaissance company, a chemical company, and a security guard company integral to the division echelon -- that is, some nine battalion-equivalents. 15/

21. This memorandum does not contend that Communist divisions in South Vietnam have all the integral support units listed in the USARPAC study. Nor does it maintain that there are no geographical variations in divisional support structures -- that, for example, a division on the DMZ is identical to one operating near COSVN headquarters. The memorandum asserts, however, that every Communist division needs, at a minimum, a certain number of integral support units to operate effectively.

22. It is unlikely, for example, that the 325C Division -- near the DMZ and listed in the OB as having no integral support units -- could operate effectively without them. One recent POW indicated

TOP SECRET

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that, in fact, the division had a number of integral support units, including two antiaircraft battalions, an engineer battalion, a signal battalion, a transportation battalion, a medical battalion, and a mortar company. 16/ None was carried in the OB.

23. Similarly, a recent document indicated that on 24 September 1967 the VC 9th Division had a signal battalion, a reconnaissance battalion, a training battalion, an artillery battalion, an antiaircraft battalion, a mortar battalion, an engineering company, a transportation company, a medical company, and a convalescence company. 17/ None was identified in the OB. Some of these formations had probably been with the division for a considerable time. The artillery unit, for example, had been attached to the division at least since April 1966, some seven months after the 9th Division was organized. 18/

24. In the case of the VC 9th Division, the number of "headquarters and support" troops carried is unusually large -- 750 -- and the 750 probably includes soldiers attached to integral, but unidentified, support elements. (An intelligence report from the II Field Force Vietnam suggests that this is the case.) 19/ Even taking this into

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TOP SECRET

account, it would still appear that the 9th Division has more than 750 support troops. If one assumes that the support battalions listed in the document have 270 men each* and the companies have 70 men each (and that the division has an additional headquarters element of 250 men), then the number of support troops integral to the 9th Division is 2,150, or some 1,400 more than are listed in the OB.

25. Because full evidence on the support and service structures of Communist divisions is lacking, their size must be estimated. On the basis of available documentary evidence and TOE's, this memorandum estimates that the seven three-regiment Communist divisions carried in the OB had between six and eight battalion-equivalent integral support and service units. It further estimates that the two two-regiment divisions carried in the OB had between four and five battalion-equivalent integral support and service units. In addition, it is assumed that the three-regiment divisions each had 250-man headquarters contingents and the two-regiment divisions each had 200-man headquarters contingents. 20/ Using these assumptions, it follows that on 31 January 1968 there were between

* *The MACV OB lists the average division-level support battalion at 270 men.*

TOP SECRET

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16,650 and 19,970 service and support personnel subordinate to divisions listed in the OB. A breakout of these personnel is as follows:

Seven three-regiment divisions
with between six and eight
270-man battalion equivalents
each, plus a 250-man head-
quarters contingent each 13,090 to 16,870

Two two-regiment divisions with
between four and five 270-man
battalion-equivalents each,
plus a 200-man headquarters
contingent each 2,560 to 3,100

Total 15,650 to 19,970

26. Because the 31 January OB carried 10,255 men subordinate to the nine divisions listed, it would appear, therefore, that there were between 5,395 and 9,725 divisional service and support troops missing, or, rounded to the nearest thousand, 5,000 to 10,000.

Other Factors Suggesting the Main Force/Local Force OB Was Low

27. There are additional factors making it probable that the Main Force/Local Force OB was low prior to the Tet offensive and which, therefore, suggest that the range of 158,000 to 164,000 given as the actual number of such troops is conservative. They are:

TOP SECRET

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a. That in adding gains and subtracting losses from units listed in the OB, the methods used by MACV have favored losses over gains.

b. That just prior to the Tet offensive, large numbers of upgraded guerrillas were added to Main Force/Local Force units.

28. The process of adding and subtracting personnel from formations in the OB to take into account gains and losses seems to favor the latter over the former. Soldiers are customarily deducted from Main and Local Force units on the basis of body counts. On the other hand, strengths of units are adjusted upward on the basis of recent captured documents and POW reports. Body count reports are current and provide coverage of most actions in which Main and Local Force units are engaged. POW interrogations and captured documents which provide information on strengths are available only sporadically and in the case of the latter most often contain dated information. In the absence of a reported reinforcement, or new strength figure, the MACV OB methodology appears to assume replacements after

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about 90 days. When the enemy's replacement capability is more rapid than this or the KIA is off, the results may be substantial.

29. A case in point is the experience of the 273rd Regiment of the VC 9th Division, which was engaged in battles in the Loc Ninh area in late 1967. As a result of battlefield body counts, MACV attrited the 273rd from 1,750 (as held in the 31 October OB) to 1,200 (as held in the 31 December OB). Yet a captured VC report dated 27 January 1968 indicated the strength of the 273rd was at that moment 1,802. 21/ It is likely that in subsequent OB's, the document, which was captured by chance, will be taken into account. Were no such report received, however, the OB figure probably would have remained low for some time.

30. Finally, a variety of reports from the countryside indicate that prior to the Tet offensive unusually large numbers of village and hamlet guerrillas were upgraded as individuals or attached as units to Main and Local Force formations to bring them up to strength or to expand them. The number of such guerrillas has been estimated at 20,000. Because it is not clear how many of these guerrillas were to stay permanently with the higher

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level units (and because adding them to the Main and Local Force OB would involve the bookkeeping change of subtracting them from guerrilla strength), this memorandum does not take guerrilla upgrading into account.

TOP SECRET

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Appendix A

The Communist Force Structure

1. The MACV Order of Battle carries the following definitions for the Main Forces, the Local Forces, and the Administrative Services:

a. The Main Forces are "those military units which are directly subordinate to the Central Office of South Vietnam (COSVN), a Viet Cong Military Region, or Subregion." (MACV counts NVA units in South Vietnam among the Main Forces, although technically some of these units are directly subordinate to command entities in North Vietnam.)

b. The Local Forces are "those military units which are directly subordinate to a provincial or district party committee and normally operate only within a specified VC province or district."

c. The Administrative Services are "military personnel in identified COSVN, military region, military subregion, province and district staffs, and rear service technical units of all types directly subordinate to these headquarters."

TOP SECRET

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2. The Communists' definitions of the Main and Local Forces are considerably broader than those of MACV.

a. The Communists do not have a category called "Administrative Service" troops distinct from the Main and Local Forces. Thus an ordnance sergeant belonging to a unit subordinate to a provincial Rear Services staff -- whom MACV would classify as belonging to the "Administrative Services" -- would be carried on the Communist rolls as a Local Force soldier.

b. The Communists also classify soldiers subordinate to *vungs* (areas), cities, and certain plantations as Local Force soldiers.

3. This memorandum accepts MACV usage throughout. It does not attempt to add "Administrative Service" troops -- as defined by MACV -- to the Main and Local Forces. It also follows MACV's example in assigning *vung* (as in the case of Ninh Thuan) and city (as in the case of Nha Trang) soldiers to the Local Force OB.

TOP SECRET

Appendix B

Service and Support Troops Integral to Divisions
Listed in the MACV OB a/

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<u>Divisions</u>	<u>Overall Divisional Strength</u>	<u>Troops Assigned to Regiments</u>	<u>Divisional Head-quarters and Support Troops</u>	<u>Integral Service and Support Battalions</u>	<u>Troops Assigned to Service and Support Battalions</u>	<u>Total Service & Support Troops (Columns 4 & 6)</u>
NVA 2nd	5,550	4,150	100	5	1,300	1,400
NVA 324B	9,500	7,800	120	7	1,580	1,700
NVA 325C	5,500	5,400	100	0	0	100
NVA 1st	6,670	5,240	100	5	1,330	1,430
NVA 3rd	6,684	3,759	655	7	2,270	2,925
NVA 5th	2,890	2,790	100	0	0 ✓	100
VC 5th	3,700	2,750	650	1	300	950
NVA 7th	5,820	4,920	900	0	0 ✓	900
VC 9th	3,995	3,245	750	0	0	750
Total	<u>50,309</u>	<u>40,054</u>	<u>3,475</u>	<u>25</u>	<u>6,780</u>	<u>10,255</u>

a. Based on the 30 January 1968 OB. The NVA 5th Division and the VC 5th Division have two infantry regiments. The rest have three.

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
- 23 -

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Appendix C

ORGANIZATION OF THE VIET CONG 9TH DIVISION *



* See MACV DEC Log. 02-1261-68. (Date of information: 24 September 1967.) As of 30 January 1968, none of the support units (six battalions and four companies) was carried in the MACV OB.
 ** The staffs, although not separately identified in DEC Log. 02-1261-68, were almost certainly there.

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APPENDIX D

Criteria for Acceptance into the MACV OB*


1. Confirmed Unit: A confirmed unit is one whose designation is known, its subordination established, and the location determined from a minimum of two reports from VC/NVA POW's or returnees (Hoi Chanh) from the unit, or from captured documents (any combination).

2. Probable Unit: A probable unit is one whose designation is known, its subordination established, and location determined from one VC/NVA POW or returnee (Hoi Chanh) from the unit, or from a captured document, when supported by information from other sources, which can be evaluated as probably true.

3. Possible Unit: A possible unit is accepted as such where repeated reports from different sources indicate that the unit exists, even though

* *The total of 115,016 carried in the MACV OB was a compilation of strengths of confirmed, probable, and possible units.*

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET 

no VC/NVA POW's or returnees (Hoi Chanh) from the unit or captured documents are available to verify the reports.

4. Reported Unit: A reported unit is one which has been mentioned in agent reports, captured documents, or interrogation reports, but the available information is insufficient to include the unit in accepted OB holdings.

TOP SECRET 

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX E

Source References

1. E.g. CMIC Logs. 12-060-67, 170-68, 179-68, and 303-68, CDEC Logs. 02-1555-68, and 02-1556-68.
2. Long Dat District in VC Ba Bien Province (MACV Translation Report 06-1409-67), Tien Phuoc District in GVN Quang Tin (MACV DEC Log. 10-1195-67), Long Thanh District in GVN Bien Hoa (MACV DEC Log. 09-1808-67), Ben Cat District in VC Thu Dau Mot (MACV Translation Report 02-1415-67), Go Dau District in VC Tay Ninh (MACV DEC Log. 07-2998-67), Nhon Trach District in VC Ba Bien (MACV DEC Log. 09-1970-67), Ben Cau District in VC Tay Ninh (MACV DEC Log. 08-2372-67), Duc Hoa District in VC Long An (MACV DEC Log. 07-2622-67), Tan Uyen District in VC Thu Dau Mot (MACV DEC Log. 08-3063-67), seven districts in VC Can Tho (MACV Translation Report 01-1610-67), Phu Quoc District in GVN Kien Giang (MACV DEC Log. 03-2162-67), Trang Bang District in VC Tay Ninh

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

(MACV Translation Report 06-1168-67),
Duong Minh Chau District in VC Tay Ninh
(MACV Translation Report 06-1168-67), Toa
Thanh District in VC Tay Ninh (MACV Trans-
lation Report 06-1168-67), Chau Thanh
District in VC Thu Dau Mot (MACV DEC Log.
12-1909-67), Lia Thieu District in VC Thu
Dau Mot (MACV DEC Log. 12-1909-67), Dau
Tieng District in VC Thu Dau Mot (MACV DEC
Log. 12-1909-67), seven sapper units
attached to six districts in VC Quang Ngai
(MACV DEC Log. 09-1521-67), Chau Duc Dis-
trict in VC Ba Bien Province (MACV DEC Log.
12-1914-67), Xuan Loc and Dinh Quan
Districts in VC Long Khanh (MACV DEC Log.
12-1109-67), and a U/I District in VC Kien
Phong (MACV DEC Log. 12-2273-67). The
citations include five districts in which
no specialized soldiers were identified.
These districts were averaged in with the
rest.

3. MACV DEC Log. 08-1313-66.
4. MACV Translation Report 03-1359-66.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

5. A preliminary review of captured documents picked up the following specialized units subordinate to provinces and apparently absent from the OB. In VC Ca Mau Province, 94 sappers and engineers subordinate to province; in VC Can Tho Province an engineering company, a sapper unit, and an engineering and sapper company, totaling 195 men; in VC Rach Gia Province a sapper platoon and an engineering unit totaling 49 men. (IR-6075989366, DOI prior to May 1966). In VC Quang Ngai Province, the 21st sapper company, 115 strong (MACV 09-1521-67, DOI July 1967). In VC Gia Lai Province, the 408th Sapper Battalion with a TO/E of 360 men, created in November 1966, (MACV DEC Log. 01-1988-68, 01-1998-68, and 01-1999-68). In VC Thu Dau Mot Province, 67 sappers, engineers, and special action personnel, (MACV DEC Log. 12-1909-67). In VC Tay Ninh, 66 sappers, engineers, reconnaissance and special action personnel

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

(MACV DEC Log. 07-2946-67). In VC Long Khanh Province, 20 sappers and engineers (MACV DEC Log. 12-1109-67). In VC Ninh Thuan Province, four specialized units totaling 97 men (MACV Translation Report 07-2373-67, page 10). In VC Long An Province, 2 sapper companies (1 listed in the OB), one combat reconnaissance company, 2 "Army engineer" units, 2 "Navy engineer" (probably UDT) units, and 2 special action units (MACV DEC Log. 06-3094-67).

6. For example, the Da Nang City Unit, which apparently included the T89 -- and possibly the T87 -- battalions (see MACV DEC Log. 07-3050-67, the first translation of large numbers of documents captured at ZC070677 on 22 July 1967, pertaining to the Da Nang City unit), the Bien Hoa City Unit, apparently at least company-size (MACV DEC Log. 10-1531-67, 02-2290-68, and 02-1041-68), an unidentified city unit of undetermined size in Long An (MACV DEC Log. 07-2656-67), a city unit of undetermined size

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

in Tay Ninh (MACV DEC Log. 07-3056-67), the Pleiku City Unit, of undetermined size (MACV DEC Log. 01-1997-68), the Ben Tre City Unit, company-size (MACV DEC Log. 09-2430-67), the Tam Ky, Qui Nhon, Kontum, and Ban Me Thuot City Units, all reported company-size, (CMIC Log. 11-107-67), the Quang Ngai City Unit, of undetermined size (MACV DEC Log. 09-1151-67), the Thu Dau Mot City Unit, of undetermined size (MACV DEC Log. 12-1909-67), a city unit in the vicinity of Da Lat, of undetermined size (MACV DEC Log. 01-2402-68), the Phan Thiet City Unit, two companies and one platoon (MACV DEC Log. 02-2272-68), and the Bao Loc City Unit, of undetermined size (MACV DEC Log. 02-2225-68).

7. MACV Translation Report 02-2354-67, "The Development of City Sapper Activities," page 1, and MACV Translation Report 02-1734-67, a COSVN document concerning the "Urban Sapper Movement."
8. E.g., MACV DEC Log. 10-1548-67.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

9. MACV Translation Report 01-3033-67 indicates there were some 400 *vung* troops subordinate to Region IV in 1966. They have never been included in the OB. Although it is unclear whether *vungs* survived the recent reorganization of Region IV (see CDEC Bulletin 9017 and a report to the director general of the National Police, entitled, "New VC Territorial Organization," published late February 1968), the soldiers attached to the *vungs* were almost certainly extant, in one form or another, prior to the Tet offensive. See also MACV DEC Log. 01-1999-68, which suggests VC Gia Lai has *vung* (or possibly district) troops absent from the OB.
10. E.g., MACV DEC Log. 08-1313-66.
11. E.g., MACV DEC Log. 01-1988-68 which describes the VC plans for the attack on Pleiku City. The units involved included a local force battalion, a province-level sapper company, and the Pleiku City Unit. The two last-mentioned units did not appear to be in the OB.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

12. MACV DEC Log. 07-3335-67.
13. MACV DEC Log. 01-1637-68. How many soldiers MACV would assign the B3 Front School is in one sense theoretical, since the total number of headquarters and support troops listed for the Front in the OB is 500. Some estimates of the actual number of B3 support troops have exceeded 10,000.
14. See the II Field Force Vietnam OB Summary of July 1967, page 10, in which II Field Force listed two battalions and seven companies subordinate to the VC Ninth.
15. See The North Vietnamese Order of Battle, Special Report 450, TOE Annex, Headquarters, United States Army Pacific, 1 September 1967, page 6. See also, "The Enemy Divisional Structure," a memorandum published by MACV on 11 May 1966.
16. DIA Report Number 6-028-4252-68.
17. MACV DEC Log. 02-1261-68.
18. MACV DEC Log. 02-1045-68 and 02-1047-68.
19. II Field Force Vietnam OB Summary, July 1967, page 10.

TOP SECRET

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20. No direct evidence has come to light at the CIA concerning the size of division-level headquarters detachments. The USARPAC Report mentioned in No. 15, above, estimates (on page 6) that the TOE size of such detachments is 200 men. This memorandum estimates their size is somewhat higher because captured documents indicate regimental headquarters average around 150 men. (See MACV DEC Log. 02-1322-68, in which the 273rd Regimental staffs are held at 137 men, and MACV DEC Log. 02-2224-68, in which headquarters of the 2nd Regiment of the 3rd NVA Division is held at 177 men.) It is likely that divisional staffs are considerably larger than regimental staffs.
21. MACV DEC Log. 02-1322-68.

TOP SECRET

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